Why an Afghan Surge Won’t Work

As I watched Daily Show yesterday, Dana Perrino pointed out an important statistic in gauging the success of Iraq and Afghanistan. According to UNICEF, the adult literacy rate in Iraq is around 74% for the years 2000-2005. In other words, 3 out of every 4 Iraqis have basic reading skills. In contrast, consider Afghanistan who has a literacy rate of 28%. This is nearly the polar opposite of Iraq; it appears about only 1 out of every 4 Afghans have basic reading skills.

You may say so what? What does reading ability have to do with recovery? As a former soldier in the US Army, I’m not sure how much I could have learned if I couldn’t read. With these two statistics, one can see the uphill battle the United States and NATO will have with restoring peace to Afghanistan.

When the United States invaded Iraq in 2003, we not only allowed looting, but also disbanded the Army. It was apparent that the next few years would be a mess. Everyone watched in horror as Iraq descended into sectarian violence and ethnic cleansing. No doubt most saw Iraq as a failed state, with good reason. Former Iraqi soldiers had joined various causes to lend their military training to an insurgent movement. In addition to many forces, Iraqis’ basic education has helped them recover in a relatively short time. As poor a decision it was to disband the Army, it was infinitely easier to train them once they have been gathered again. When soldiers can read and have a fundamental education, this allows training to be effective much quicker. This is a luxury the Afghan people do not have.

Part of the “Surge” was training a regular army to take up the space insurgent militias were occupying in Iraqi life. Once insurgents stopped attacking Army recruiting lines, the Army grew exponentially. This Army is now far more sophisticated than it was even two years ago. They were able to battle and win against the feared al-Sadr militia. A measure of security is finally beginning to take hold in Iraq. So why won’t this work in Afghanistan?

After a successful NATO campaign in Afghanistan, it appeared things were looking up for the broken state. They had elected a popular head of state, the cities were secured, and attacks waned. As someone who watches the news knows, this situation has been rapidly deteriorating since 2006. It had taken the Taliban about four years to regroup and continue the jihad begun in 2001. This is not dissimilar to how the Iraqi insurgency began. Although it was not nearly as long as in Afghanistan, Iraqi insurgents regrouped after the invasion and attacked with full force. Afghans are now attacking with equal force. Unfortunately, the same strategy that worked so well for the US in Iraq will not have the same effect in Afghanistan.

In addition to the religious and cultural differences between Afghans, there is an extremely high poverty rate and a high illiteracy rate. Indeed, Afghanistan is one of the poorest nations on Earth. With opium production where it is, there is also an ubiquitous drug problem. Training an Army to protect a population this destitute will be an enormous task to undertake. If people cannot read, how do you recruit? You can’t pass out flyers or pamphlets. Building an Army takes that much longer. Without the aid of manuals and written protocol, an Army must be trained with pictures and gestures. If not impossible, it will at least take far longer to train a regular Army than it did in Iraq.

As an NCO in the Army, I was able to train my soldiers relatively quickly because of my soldiers’ basic education (they could read). I used manuals, written tests, and hands-on evaluations to grade and train soldiers. Since most Afghan men are illiterate with little to no education, the task of training them becomes monumental. With the country as spread out as it is, the Army’s task becomes that much harder.

Consider this: 67% of Iraq’s population is in cities. Compare this to 23% in Afghanistan. This statistic alone portends great strife in the future of Afghanistan. When the United States and its allies invaded and took Afghanistan’s major cities in 2002, many Americans believed the war to be over. After the fighting in Tora Bora, it appeared as if the Taliban and Al-Qaeda were routed. In our Western thinking, once the capital city falls, the war is over. This is not so in Afghanistan. We made the same mistake USSR made, the same mistake Alexander the Great made: we took the cities and called it a day. Remember nearly 3/4 of Afghanistan’s population lives in rural areas. The cities in Afghanistan are peripheral at best. Now they too are under attack. It is frightening to realize that an American-style “surge” may not work in Afghanistan. The attacks are occuring in Afghanistan at an alarming rate, and are looking much like those we saw several years ago in Iraq. Iraq was relatively easier to corral because so many people live in the cities. There are not enough troops in NATO to complete a successful surge. The Taliban explode schools after they come up. This will not work as it did in Iraq, and I weep for the future of Afghanistan.